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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal in a diversity case arises from an overtime 
pay dispute between a private employer and a number of its 
employees. Its resolution turns primarily upon a 
determination whether the New Jersey Commissioner of 
Labor exceeded his authority when he promulgated a 
regulation that excluded certain trucking industry 
employees, including the plaintiffs here, from New Jersey's 
statutory overtime pay requirement. The principal aim of 
this regulation was to avoid job loss that might result if 
New Jersey trucking industry employers were required-- 
unlike their counterparts in neighboring states--to pay 
regular overtime wages to their employees. New Jersey's 
statutory overtime provision, applicable to most private- 
sector workers in the state, requires employers to pay 
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overtime at a rate of "1-1/2 times [each] employee's regular 
hourly wage." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:11-56a4. By contrast, 
the regulation at issue here requires only that trucking 
industry employers pay their employees "an overtime rate 
not less than one and one-half times the [state] minimum 
wage." N.J. Admin. Code S 12:56-19.3. Because most 
trucking industry employees, including the plaintiffs here 
(with one minor exception), earn wages exceeding "one and 
one-half times the [state] minimum wage," the regulation's 
purported requirement that employers pay an overtime 
premium is rendered superfluous. 
 
Our reading of New Jersey's Wage and Hour Law, and of 
New Jersey precedent in this area and in the administrative 
law field, leads us to the conclusion that the Commissioner 
exceeded his authority in enacting this regulation. The text 
of the statute plainly limits the Commissioner to 
promulgating wage orders only in those cases in which "a 
substantial number of employees in any occupation or 
occupations are receiving less than a fair wage." N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 34:11-56a8 (emphasis added). The Commissioner 
made no such finding in this case, and in fact, implicitly 
justified adoption of the challenged regulation on the 
opposite ground, i.e., that the covered employees' wages 
were too high, thereby threatening New Jersey's trucking 
industry. Additionally, New Jersey's legislature has 
explicitly declared the policy of the Wage and Hour Law to 
be protecting employees from unfair wages and excessive 
hours, and the state's courts have repeatedly affirmed the 
protective nature of the statute. The trucking industry 
regulation issued by the Commissioner contravenes not 
only the plain language of the statute, but also this clearly 
expressed policy. 
 
Finally, New Jersey precedent in both the Wage and Hour 
Law context and in the broader field of administrative law 
supports our conclusion that the Commissioner's 
promulgation of the challenged regulation exceeded his 
authority. Because we find that the Commissioner exceeded 
his authority in promulgating this regulation, we hold that 
the defendant Loomis Fargo may not assert the regulation 
as a defense to plaintiffs' claims for unpaid overtime wages. 
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We also conclude that the New Jersey good-faith defense 
for failure to pay overtime wages may apply to the period at 
issue here. The New Jersey good-faith defense requires both 
that the employer acted in good faith and that it relied on 
a written regulation, administrative practice, or 
enforcement policy of the relevant state agency. For the 
period prior to the enactment of the challenged regulation, 
there is no evidence in this record that the defendant relied 
on one of the enumerated sources in failing to pay the 
statutorily required overtime. We will therefore remand to 
the District Court for a determination whether the employer 
acted on the basis of an administrative practice or 
enforcement policy prior to the regulation's enactment. 
Because the New Jersey statute requires that the 
employer's good faith be based on an action or policy of a 
state agency, the employer may not rely on remand, as it 
did originally, on such sources as industry practice or 
union acquiescence to meet its burden to prove the good- 
faith defense for the pre-regulation period. 
 
After the regulation was enacted, the employer would 
seem to have relied on that regulation to justify its failure 
to pay the statutory overtime rate. However, the record is 
silent on the basis for the employer's refusal to pay the 
statutory rate, and the District Court did not reach the 
issue whether the defendant acted with the requisite good 
faith in not paying the statutory rate. There may 
conceivably be some other explanation for the refusal other 
than good-faith reliance on the regulation, and hence we 
will leave for the District Court to determine in the first 
instance, following remand, whether the employer acted 
with good faith after the Commissioner of Labor 
promulgated the regulation at issue. 
 
I. Procedural History 
 
Since 1966, New Jersey's Wage and Hour Law, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. SS 34:11-56a to -56a30, has required most employers 
in the state to pay employees 1-1/2 times their regular 
hourly wage rate for work in excess of forty hours per week.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") similarly requires the payment 
of time-and-a-half for overtime work. See 29 U.S.C. S 207(a)(1) (1994). 
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Plaintiffs are four current or former employees of defendant 
Loomis Fargo (the successor to Wells Fargo Armored 
Service Corp.), which, for all relevant time periods, has 
failed to pay plaintiffs overtime pay according to the Wage 
and Hour Law. On November 13, 1997, plaintiffs filed a 
putative class action in New Jersey state court on behalf of 
themselves and similarly situated Loomis Fargo employees, 
seeking damages and equitable relief for Loomis Fargo's 
failure to pay overtime.2 Loomis Fargo, a non New Jersey 
citizen, removed the case to federal court. 
 
Initially, Loomis Fargo moved to have the case dismissed 
on preemption grounds, arguing that the FLSA and the 
Federal Motor Carrier Act preempted New Jersey's 
minimum wage and overtime law. The District Court denied 
this motion. See Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & Co., 11 F. Supp. 
2d 517, 521 (D.N.J. 1998). Less than a month later, the 
Magistrate Judge assigned to the case ordered the parties 
to file cross-motions for summary judgment on the basis of 
another defense put forth by Loomis Fargo, i.e., that its 
employees were exempted from the overtime law's 
requirements by a regulation promulgated by the New 
Jersey Commissioner of Labor in 1996. See J.A. at 51. The 
plaintiffs contended that the regulation exempting them 
from the overtime provision's coverage was invalid, as the 
Commissioner had no authority to enact it, and that they 
were therefore entitled to 1-1/2 times their regular hourly 
wages for any overtime work. The District Court held that 
the regulation was valid, and that for the period prior to the 
effective date of the regulation the defendant had acted with 
a good-faith belief that it need not pay overtime, thereby 
absolving it of any liability. See Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & 
Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451-52 (D.N.J. 1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
However, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are exempted from the 
overtime requirements of the FLSA, see id. S 213(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 
1996), and we therefore confine our discussion to the New Jersey 
overtime law. 
 
2. As the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law has a two-year statute of 
limitations, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:11-56a25.1 (1988), plaintiffs' 
claims 
for past unpaid wages are limited to the period beginning November 13, 
1995. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity 
case under 28 U.S.C. S 1332, while we have jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal of the District Court's final order granting 
summary judgment to defendant under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Our review of the District Court's order is plenary. We must 
apply the same standard that the District Court was 
required to apply, "construing all evidence and resolving all 
doubts raised by affidavits, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file in favor of the non- 
moving party." Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 
302 (3d Cir. 1998). However, in resolving the primary 
disputed issue in this case--the validity of the state 
regulation excluding plaintiffs from the overtime law's 
coverage--we are faced with a purely legal issue. To the 
extent that factual issues remain regarding Loomis Fargo's 
good-faith defense, we will remand for the District Court's 
determination of these issues in the first instance. 
 
II. New Jersey Minimum Wage and Overtime Provisions 
 
A. Statutory Provisions 
 
New Jersey's overtime pay statute provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
        Every employer shall pay to each of his employees 
       wages at a rate . . . 1-1/2 times such employee's 
       regular hourly wage for each hour of working time in 
       excess of 40 hours in any week, except this overtime 
       rate shall not include any individual employed in a 
       bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 
       capacity or, if an applicable wage order has been 
       issued by the commissioner under [S 34:11-56a16], not 
       less than the wages prescribed in said order. . . . 
 
        The provisions of this section for the payment to an 
       employee of not less than 1-1/2 times such employee's 
       regular hourly rate for each hour of working time in 
       excess of 40 hours in any week shall not apply to 
       employees engaged to labor on a farm or employed in 
       a hotel or to an employee of a common carrier of 
       passengers by motor bus or to a limousine driver who 
       is an employee of an employer engaged in the business 
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       of operating limousines or to employees engaged in 
       labor relative to the raising or care of livestock. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:11-56a4 (1988 & Supp. 1999). 
 
The New Jersey legislature, in establishing this overtime 
pay requirement--and the related minimum-wage 
requirement--explicitly outlined the policy behind its 
enactment: "[T]o safeguard [workers'] health, efficiency, and 
general well-being and to protect them as well as their 
employers from the effects of serious and unfair 
competition resulting from wage levels detrimental to their 
health, efficiency and well-being." Id. S 34:11-56a (1988). 
 
Another provision of the law provides for appointment of 
wage boards by the Commissioner of Labor, which boards 
may recommend to the Commissioner the adoption of 
regulations governing minimum wages and overtime. The 
key provision provides, in full: 
 
        If the commissioner is of the opinion that a 
       substantial number of employees in any occupation or 
       occupations are receiving less than a fair wage, he 
       shall appoint a wage board as provided in [S 34:11- 
       56a9] to report upon the establishment of minimum 
       fair wage rates for employees in such occupation or 
       occupations. 
 
Id. S 34:11-56a8. Section 34:11-56a9 outlines the 
procedure by which wage board members are appointed 
and establishes the number and nature (i.e., employer 
representatives, employee representatives, etc.) of such 
members. Upon a majority vote of a wage board's members, 
the board may "recommend minimum fair wage rates" and 
the "establishment or modification of the number of hours 
per week after which the overtime rate established in 
[S 34:11-56a4] shall apply and . . . the establishment or 
modification of said overtime rate." Id. S 34:11-56a13. 
 
Following issuance of a wage board's report to the 
Commissioner, notice and a public hearing must be held. 
See id. S 34:11-56a15. Within ten days after the hearing, 
the Commissioner must either approve or disapprove the 
report: 
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       If the report is approved, the commissioner shall make 
       a wage order which shall define minimum fair wage 
       rates in the occupation or occupations as 
       recommended in the report of the wage board and 
       which shall include such proposed administrative 
       regulations as the commissioner may deem appropriate 
       to supplement the report of the wage board and to 
       safeguard the minimum fair wage standards 
       established. Such administrative regulations may 
       include among other things, . . . overtime or part-time 
       rates . . . . 
 
Id. S 34:11-56a16. In 1972, a provision was added to the 
Wage and Hour Law that provides, in full, that "[t]he 
provisions of this act shall be applicable to wages covered 
by wage orders issued pursuant to [S 34:11-56a16]." Id. 
S 34:11-56a4.2. 
 
B. The Regulations 
 
Pursuant to the foregoing statutory provisions, the 
Commissioner has promulgated regulations that govern 
wages and hours for workers in a number of occupations. 
The regulation at issue in this case provides: 
 
        Every trucking industry employer shall pay to all 
       drivers, helpers, loaders and mechanics for whom the 
       Secretary of Transportation may prescribe maximum 
       hours of work for the safe operation of vehicles 
       pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 31502(b) an overtime rate not 
       less than one and one-half times the minimum wage 
       required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4 and N.J.A.C. 
       12:56-3.1. 
 
N.J. Admin. Code S 12:56-19.3 (1998). This regulation was 
proposed by the Commissioner on March 18, 1996, and 
adopted on July 15, 1996, with an effective date of August 
5, 1996. Defendant Loomis Fargo is a "trucking industry 
employer," and the plaintiffs are all "drivers, helpers, 
loaders [or] mechanics" covered by the reference to 49 
U.S.C. S 31502(b). Therefore, there is no question that the 
regulation applies to the present dispute and that, if it is 
valid, it justifies defendant's payment of overtime wages 
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that are less than the statutory minimum, but that are 
consistent with the regulation. 
 
The commissioner has promulgated a number of other 
regulations that govern various categories of employees and 
employers. For example, one regulation exempts six 
categories of workers from the minimum wage laws. 3 See 
N.J. Admin. Code S 12:56-3.2 (1995). However, each of 
these categories is already specifically exempted under the 
statutory minimum wage provision. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
SS 34:11-56a4, -56a4.1. Other regulations in fact extend the 
statutory overtime provisions, with certain modifications, to 
employees who are otherwise exempted (by explicit 
legislative mandate) from the statute's coverage. See N.J. 
Admin. Code SS 12:56-11.3, -13.3. Additional regulations, 
covering food service employees, air carrier employees, and 
skilled mechanics, provide that these employees must be 
paid overtime (as defined in the statute), with certain 
adjustments relevant to their industries.4  
 
None of the foregoing regulations exempt employees from 
the statute's overtime or minimum wage provisions when 
such an exemption does not appear in the statute itself. In 
fact, from the parties' submissions and our own research, 
it appears that the only categories of employees exempted 
from the law's overtime requirements by regulation, but not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The exempted categories include certain full-time college students, 
outside sales persons, motor vehicle sales persons, part-time home- 
based childcare workers, certain minors, and employees at "summer 
camps, conferences and retreats operated by any nonprofit or religious 
corporation or association during the months of June, July, August and 
September." 
 
4. See N.J. Admin. Code S 12:56-14.3(a)(3) (1995) (providing, in the case 
of food industry employees, that "[f]ood and lodging supplied to 
employees shall not be included in wages for those hours worked in 
excess of 40 hours per week"); id. S 12:56-15.3(a) (allowing the use of 
compensatory time off instead of overtime pay for air carrier employees, 
in certain circumstances); id. S 12:56-20.3(a) (1998) (providing that 
skilled mechanics employed by auto dealers are exempt from the 
overtime provisions only if they are paid on a flat or incentive-rate 
basis 
and are "guaranteed a basic contractual hourly rate [that] . . . must 
include payment of time and one-half of the hourly rate for all hours 
actually worked in excess of 40 hours per week"). 
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also exempted by statute, are seasonal amusement 
employees and trucking industry employees. The defendant 
additionally cites the skilled mechanic regulation as 
evidence that the Commissioner has the authority to 
exempt groups of employees not explicitly exempted by the 
statute. See Appellee's Br. at 14 & n.10. However, it fails to 
note that the skilled mechanic regulation effectively 
requires that these employees be paid at the statutory 
overtime rate. See N.J. Admin. Code S 12:56-20.3(a) (1998) 
(providing that skilled mechanics are "guaranteed a basic 
contractual hourly rate [that] . . . must include payment of 
time and one-half of the hourly rate for all hours actually 
worked in excess of 40 hours per week"). 
 
Seasonal amusement employees are exempted from the 
overtime provisions (but not the minimum wage provisions) 
altogether. See id. S 12:56-12.3 (1995).5 Trucking industry 
employees--the group at issue in this case--are partially 
exempted, in that they are entitled to overtime pay of at 
least 1-1/2 times the minimum wage, rather than 1-1/2 
times their own hourly wage rate. See id.S 12:56-19.3 
(1998). As noted above, however, because most trucking 
industry employees receive regular wages that exceed 1-1/2 
times the state minimum wage, the trucking industry 
regulation effectively exempts these employees from any 
overtime requirement and prevents them from receiving an 
overtime premium. 
 
III. Validity of the Trucking Industry Regulation 
 
If the regulation at issue here is valid, it would provide a 
complete defense to defendant's failure to pay overtime to 
its employees for the period following its effective date of 
August 5, 1996. (We discuss below defendant's possible 
good-faith defense for its failure to pay overtime before-- 
and after--the regulation's enactment.) Therefore, our 
primary task is to determine whether the trucking industry 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The issue whether the seasonal amusement employee regulation is 
valid is not before us. We therefore draw no inference from the 
Commissioner's promulgation of this regulation exempting apparently 
otherwise-covered employees from the statutory overtime provision. 
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regulation was validly promulgated by the Commissioner 
under the terms of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. 
 
A. New Jersey Case Law 
 
Decisions of New Jersey's courts involving both the Wage 
and Hour Law and other administrative regimes are 
instructive in our determination whether the Commissioner 
exceeded his authority in the present case. In the wage law 
context, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court held in a pre-1966 case that the Commissioner of 
Labor exceeded his authority in issuing a wage order 
setting minimum wages for certain hotel employees, when 
the statute at that time explicitly excluded hotel employees 
from its coverage. See Hotel Suburban Sys., Inc. v. 
Holderman, 125 A.2d 908, 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1956). Unlike the current Wage and Hour Law, the pre- 
1966 statute did not establish minimum wages or 
maximum hours, but conferred authority on the 
Commissioner to promulgate wage and hour requirements 
on an industry-by-industry basis, through the issuing of 
wage orders. However, the statute explicitly excluded 
certain occupations from the Commissioner's authority. 
 
In Hotel Suburban, the court noted that the 
Commissioner's exercise of his authority "is of necessity 
restrained by the declared policy and spirit of the statute 
and the criteria and standards therein laid down," and "the 
rules and regulations and administrative action cannot 
subvert or enlarge upon the statutory policy or . . . . deviate 
from the principle and policy of the statute." Id. at 911 
(quoting Abelson's Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of 
Optometrists, 75 A.2d 867, 872 (N.J. 1950)). Further, the 
court stated that the Commissioner could make regulations 
"consistent with, but limited by, the provisions of the 
statute," and when the statute was "clear and 
unambiguous," the Commissioner could not amend, alter, 
enlarge, or limit "the terms of the legislative enactment." Id. 
The court concluded by noting that, even conceding the 
validity of the Commissioner's policy arguments for 
including the relevant employees under the minimum wage 
act, "the authority to classify and exempt lies with the 
Legislature; it is not an administrative or judicial function." 
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Id. at 913-14; see also Silverman v. Berkson , 661 A.2d 
1266, 1268 (N.J. 1995) ("The first question in this case is 
one of agency authority. Government agencies have only 
those powers the Legislature confers on them."). 
 
Following passage of the 1966 Act, the Appellate Division 
held that the Commissioner could issue a wage order for 
occupations excepted from the statute's new minimum 
wage provisions: 
 
        Under N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a13 the wage board may 
       recommend the "establishment" of an overtime rate in 
       the particular occupation for which the wage board 
       was appointed. Since overtime is provided for under 
       N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4 as to all occupations, save those 
       specifically excepted, manifestly a wage board 
       recommendation for the "establishment" of an overtime 
       rate would have to be in one of the occupations 
       excepted from the overtime provisions of N.J.S.A. 
       34:11-56a4. 
 
New Jersey State Hotel-Motel Ass'n v. Male, 251 A.2d 466, 
467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969). 
 
New Jersey courts have also frequently discussed the 
scope of administrative agencies' authority in contexts other 
than the Wage and Hour Law. In Medical Society v. New 
Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety, 575 A.2d 1348 
(N.J. 1990), plaintiffs challenged a regulation promulgated 
by the State Board of Physical Therapy. Before evaluating 
that challenge, the state supreme court explained its scope 
of review: 
 
        An agency rule or regulation is presumptively valid, 
       and anyone challenging such a rule or regulation has 
       the burden of proving its invalidity. This presumption 
       of validity attaches if the regulation is within the 
       authority delegated to the agency and is not on its face 
       beyond the agency's power. An administrative 
       regulation, however, cannot alter the terms of a statute 
       or frustrate the legislative policy. This Court, 
       nonetheless, "places great weight on the interpretation 
       of legislation by the administrative agency to whom its 
       enforcement is entrusted." 
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Id. at 1352 (citations omitted). 
 
The court noted that its "task is to discern the extent to 
which the Legislature has delegated authority" to the 
administrative agency, looking "initially [at] the terms of the 
Act." Id. Further, the court held that, in discerning 
legislative intent, it "should try to give effect to every word 
of the statute, and should not assume that the Legislature 
used meaningless language." Id. at 1353. The court also 
looked to legislative history, particularly differences 
between the current statute and its predecessor. See id. at 
1353-54. In the end, it found the regulation at issue valid. 
See id. at 1355. 
 
The Appellate Division has also emphasized the relevance 
of a statute's underlying policy, particularly one declared 
explicitly by the legislature: 
 
        In deciding whether a particular regulation is 
       statutorily authorized, a court "may look beyond the 
       specific terms of the enabling act to the statutory policy 
       sought to be achieved by examining the entire statute 
       in light of its surroundings and objectives." . .. 
       Furthermore, declarations of public policy in enabling 
       legislation can serve as sources of statutory 
       authorization for regulations aimed at pursuing that 
       policy. 
 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. 
Protection & Energy, 661 A.2d 1314, 1319 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1995) (quoting New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid 
Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 804 (N.J. 1978)). 
 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently 
reiterated that an agency regulation must be "within the 
fair contemplation of the delegation of the enabling statute." 
New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Department of 
Community Affairs, 729 A.2d 21, 27 (N.J. 1999) (internal 
quotation omitted) ["State League"]. The court went on to 
note, as it did in Medical Society, that a determination 
whether the regulation is within the agency's delegated 
authority must begin with " `the statute's plain meaning,' " 
followed, if necessary, by analysis of "the legislative intent 
underlying the statute." State League, 729 A.2d at 28 
(citation omitted). 
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In sum, as the excerpt above from Medical Society makes 
clear, an administrative regulation "cannot alter the terms 
of a statute or frustrate the legislative policy." 575 A.2d at 
1352. In evaluating the regulation affecting trucking 
industry employees, we must look at whether it is 
consistent with the terms of the Wage and Hour Law, and 
compare the regulation to the legislative policy behind the 
law. We add only that New Jersey's law in this area is 
entirely mainstream, reflecting fundamental principles of 
statutory construction and administrative law. 
 
B. The Trucking Industry Regulation 
 
1. Text of the Statute 
 
New Jersey's Wage and Hour Law provides: "Every 
employer shall pay to each of his employees" the overtime 
rate of 1-1/2 times the employee's own wage rate. N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 34:11-56a4 (emphasis added). The plain meaning of 
"every employer" would appear to include trucking industry 
employers. See State v. Kennedy, 705 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 
1998) (finding that the "plain meaning" of a statute 
requiring restitution by "every person who violates this 
section" was that every person who violates that law, 
including one who pleads guilty, must pay restitution). 
 
Two groups are explicitly exempted from the requirement 
that "every employer" pay the statutory overtime rate. First, 
certain types of workers (executive, administrative, and 
professional) are excluded from the overtime provisions. 
Second, employees in certain industries are exempted (farm 
workers, hotel employees, etc.). Under the well-established 
principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the legislature's explicit expression of one 
thing--here, certain exceptions to the overtime requirement 
--indicates its intention to exclude other exceptions from 
the broad coverage of the overtime requirement. See 
Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 704 A.2d 1337, 1339 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (invoking expressio unius maxim 
to interpret coverage of a zoning ordinance), cert. granted, 
718 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 1998), and cert. granted, 718 A.2d 
1211 (N.J. 1998). We note that the expressed exceptions in 
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the statute plainly do not include the one at issue here, the 
trucking industry, evincing the legislature's intent to 
include this industry within the statute's overtime coverage. 
While the expressio unius maxim "can never override clear 
and contrary evidences of [legislative] intent," Abdullah v. 
American Airlines, Inc., Nos. 98-7055, -7056, 1999 WL 
415525, at *10 (3d Cir. June 23, 1999) (internal quotation 
omitted), the inference we draw from the maxim in this case 
is entirely consistent with the legislature's intent that we 
discern from a plain reading of the statutory text and the 
manifest policy behind the Wage and Hour Law. 
 
In addition to the explicit exceptions in the law--which 
do not include trucking industry employees--the legislature 
has delegated authority to the Commissioner to constitute 
wage boards and to adopt such boards' recommendations 
regarding wages and overtime. Once again, however, our 
examination of the plain language of the statutory provision 
conferring this authority militates against the conclusion 
that the Commissioner may exempt entire groups of 
employees (or employers) from the statutory overtime  
requirements.6 The relevant provision grants the 
Commissioner authority to commence the wage order 
process by appointing a wage board (only) "[i]f the 
commissioner is of the opinion that a substantial number 
of employees in any occupation or occupations are receiving 
less than a fair wage." N.J. Stat. Ann.S 34:11-56a8 
(emphasis added); see also id. S 34:11-56a7 ("The 
commissioner shall have the power, on his own motion, and 
it shall be his duty upon the petition of 50 or more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. While the regulation at issue here requires trucking industry 
employers to pay at least 1-1/2 times the statutory minimum wage to 
their employees (rather than 1-1/2 times the employees' own wage rates) 
for overtime hours, the record discloses that virtually all trucking 
industry employees have wage rates that exceed 1-1/2 times the 
statutory minimum wage. The overtime requirement in the trucking 
industry regulation is thus not a mere modification of the statutory 
overtime rate, but is largely a nullification of that statutory 
requirement. 
It is for this reason that we speak in terms of trucking industry 
employers being "exempted" or "excluded" from the overtime 
requirements by the regulation, as their employees are, in practical 
terms, paid the same wage rate for their overtime hours as they are for 
their regular hours of work. 
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residents of the State, to cause the director to investigate 
any occupation to ascertain whether a substantial number 
of employees are receiving less than a fair wage."). 
 
Section 34:11-56a8 is the only provision cited by the 
defendant, and the only one we believe exists, that grants 
the Commissioner the authority to appoint a wage board, 
which is a necessary prerequisite to the issuing of a wage 
order. See id. S 34:11-56a16. In this case, the 
Commissioner noted that the wage board was appointed 
because of uncertainty regarding whether trucking industry 
employees were covered by the overtime provision and in 
order to ensure that New Jersey trucking companies 
remained competitive with out-of-state companies that were 
not covered by their own states' overtime requirements. See 
28 N.J. Reg. 3798, 3799 (1996). The plain language of 
section 34:11-56a8, however, limits the Commissioner's 
authority to appointing a wage board when, despite the 
general protections of the wage and overtime law, a 
substantial number of employees in an industry are 
underpaid, a condition that concededly is not present here.7 
 
In short, we find that the text of the New Jersey Wage 
and Hour Law plainly covers "every employer" except those 
explicitly exempted by the legislature. Further, the 
Commissioner's authority to appoint wage boards, whose 
reports might lead to the adoption of wage orders, is clearly 
limited to those situations in which employees in the 
relevant industry are being underpaid. 
 
Before turning to an analysis of the policy underlying the 
statute, we note that section 34:11-56a4.2 was added to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In its appellate brief, the defendant appears to admit as much: "Thus, 
if there is a question as to whether a substantial number of employees 
in a particular occupation are receiving less than a fair wage, the 
Commissioner is empowered in several ways (and indeed, it may well be 
his duty) to investigate the question." Appellee's Br. at 15 n.12 
(emphasis added). While we believe this is an accurate statement of the 
Commissioner's authority under the law, as explained in the text, we 
reject defendant's argument that once a wage board is validly appointed 
because of evidence that employees are being paid less than a fair wage, 
the wage board can recommend that wages for these employees be 
lowered. 
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the statute in 1972, providing plainly and without 
exception that "[t]he provisions of [the Wage and Hour Law] 
shall be applicable to wages covered by wage orders." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 34:11-56a4.2. This clear and unequivocal 
statutory command would be overridden if the 
Commissioner could issue a wage order, such as the one 
challenged here, that was inconsistent with a provision of 
the act, such as the minimum wage or overtime provisions. 
If the statutory overtime provision is applicable to the 
trucking industry wage order, which would appear to be 
compelled by section 34:11-56a4.2, that wage order cannot 
reduce the overtime pay requirements to less than 1-1/2 
times a worker's regular hourly wage. 
 
2. Policy of the Statute 
 
As noted above, New Jersey courts have held that the 
Commissioner's authority to promulgate wage orders"is of 
necessity restrained by the declared policy and spirit of the 
statute," and "the rules and regulations and administrative 
action cannot subvert or enlarge upon the statutory policy 
or . . . . deviate from the principle and policy of the statute." 
Hotel Suburban, 125 A.2d at 911 (internal quotation 
omitted). Further, "[a]n administrative regulation . . . 
[cannot] frustrate the legislative policy." Medical Society, 
575 A.2d at 1352. Therefore, we must examine the wage 
order and the justification given by the Commissioner for 
its promulgation to determine whether the order is 
consistent with the declared policy of the Wage and Hour 
Law. 
 
The primary rationale asserted by the Commissioner for 
establishing a wage board to examine the trucking industry 
and for adopting the board's recommendation was that"the 
application of the [statutory] overtime provision could result 
in the flight of business with the resulting reduction in 
employment in this industry." 28 N.J. Reg. at 3799. By 
contrast, the declared policy of the Wage and Hour Law is 
"to safeguard [workers'] health, efficiency, and general well- 
being and to protect them as well as their employers from 
the effects of serious and unfair competition resulting from 
wage levels detrimental to their health, efficiency and well- 
being." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:11 56a. In a number of cases, 
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New Jersey courts have noted that the Wage and Hour Law 
"is social legislation designed to correct abuses in 
employment," Male, 251 A.2d at 467, and that "[t]he 
humanitarian and remedial nature of this legislation 
requires that any exemption therefrom be narrowly 
construed." Yellow Cab Co. v. State, 312 A.2d 870, 873 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). 
 
We think it beyond dispute that a policy of protecting 
local trucking businesses from competition (even if this will 
redound to the benefit of these businesses' employees) is 
fundamentally different from the stated legislative policy of 
protecting workers from unfair wage levels "detrimental to 
their health, efficiency and well-being." When the declared 
policy behind a statute is to protect workers from abusive 
practices regarding low wages and excessive hours, a 
regulation excluding a group of workers from this protective 
legislation's coverage, under the guise of keeping a local 
industry competitive, "frustrate[s] the legislative policy," 
Medical Society, 575 A.2d at 1352, and usurps"the 
authority to classify and exempt[, which] lies with the 
Legislature," Hotel Suburban, 125 A.2d at 914. 
 
While we believe that the plain language of the statute 
and its clearly stated policy inexorably lead to the 
conclusion that the Commissioner does not have the 
authority to exempt a group of employees, not otherwise 
exempted by the statute, from the law's minimum wage or 
overtime requirements, we also find support for our 
conclusion in the major changes made to the law in 1966. 
As noted above, under the pre-1966 law, no minimum 
wages or overtime pay requirements existed in the statute 
itself, while the Commissioner was explicitly authorized to 
promulgate such protective devices for certain groups of 
workers. In 1966, the law was fundamentally changed, and 
minimum wage and overtime pay requirements were 
established for all workers (with certain enumerated 
exceptions) in the statute. Under the new law, the 
Commissioner's authority changed substantially, from 
promulgating wage orders for any group of workers not 
explicitly excluded from that authority, cf. Hotel Suburban, 
125 A.2d at 912, to issuing wage orders that bring excluded 
employees under the law's coverage, cf. Male, 251 A.2d at 
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467. There is, however, no indication that the legislature 
intended, in making this change, to confer on the 
Commissioner an entirely different authority to exempt 
employees who would otherwise be included within the new 
statute's broad coverage.8 
 
3. Summary 
 
In sum, we find that the plain language of the New Jersey 
Wage and Hour Law requires, with certain enumerated 
exceptions, that "every employer" in the state pay its 
employees overtime wages at a rate of 1-1/2 times each 
employee's regular wage rate. We also find that the plain 
language of the section granting the Commissioner of Labor 
authority to form a wage board and to subsequently issue 
a wage order confers such authority only when the 
Commissioner finds that "a substantial number of 
employees in any occupation or occupations are receiving 
less than a fair wage," something that the Commissioner 
unquestionably did not find in the present case. Finally, the 
policy of the Wage and Hour Law, declared by New Jersey's 
legislature and reiterated by the state's courts, supports 
our reading of the statute's text and our conclusion that 
the Commissioner may not exempt a category of employees 
from the statute's coverage when the legislature has not 
done so itself or expressly authorized the Commissioner to 
do so. This is clearly not a case in which the plain reading 
of a statute conflicts with its underlying rationale. Cf. State 
League, 729 A.2d at 29 (rejecting a literal reading of a 
statute that "would render the Act virtually meaningless"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In a similar vein, the defendant refers us to other states in which 
wage 
orders have been issued by administrative agencies exempting truck 
drivers from overtime requirements, as support for its argument that the 
New Jersey Commissioner had authority to do so as well. In these states, 
however, the statutory provisions are more like the pre-1966 law in New 
Jersey in that no general wage or hour requirements exist in the statutes 
and broad discretion is vested in the administrative agencies to 
promulgate rules or regulations regarding wages and hours. See, e.g., 
N.D. Cent. Code S 34-06-03 (1997) ("The commissioner . . . may 
ascertain and prescribe: 1. Standards of hours of employment for 
employees and what are unreasonably long hours . . .[and] 3. Standards 
of minimum wages for employees in any occupation in this state."). 
 
                                19 
  
We therefore conclude that the Commissioner had no 
authority to promulgate the regulation challenged by 
plaintiffs, and hence defendant may not rely on the 
regulation as a defense to plaintiffs' claims for unpaid 
overtime wages that they are due under New Jersey's Wage 
and Hour Law. We will accordingly reverse the District 
Court's judgment in favor of defendant Loomis Fargo for the 
period following the regulation's promulgation. 
 
IV. The Good-Faith Defense 
 
Although we conclude that defendant may not rely on the 
trucking industry regulation to defend against plaintiffs' 
claims for unpaid overtime wages, New Jersey's Wage and 
Hour Law contains a good-faith defense that may apply to 
this case. Because the District Court held that the 
regulation was valid, it did not reach the issue of 
defendant's good-faith defense after the regulation became 
effective. However, it found that the good-faith defense did 
apply to the period before the regulation's adoption. We will 
remand for the District Court to revisit both of these issues 
because, as we discuss below, we seriously question 
whether defendant meets the requirements for the good- 
faith defense prior to the regulation's adoption, and we 
believe the District Court should have the opportunity in 
the first instance to analyze the good-faith defense's 
applicability after enactment of the regulation. 
 
A. New Jersey's Good-Faith Defense 
 
1. The Statutory Provision 
 
The statutory provision that permits a good-faith defense 
to a violation of the overtime statute provides as follows: 
 
       [N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or 
       punishment for or on account of . . . the failure of the 
       employer to pay minimum wages or overtime 
       compensation under this act, if he pleads and proves 
       that the act or omission complained of was in good 
       faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written 
       administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or 
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       interpretation by the Commissioner of the Department 
       of Labor and Industry or the Director of the Wage and 
       Hour Bureau, or any administrative practice or 
       enforcement policy of such department or bureau with 
       respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. 
       Such a defense, if established, shall be a complete bar 
       to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding, that after 
       such act or omission, such administrative regulation, 
       [etc.] . . . is modified or rescinded or is determined by 
       judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:11-56a25.2 (1988). 
 
The case law on New Jersey's good-faith defense is 
sparse. The one case relied on by the District Court, a Law 
Division case, appeared to ignore the requirement that good 
faith be based on a written regulation, order, etc., and 
found that the defendant's reliance on unrelated statutes 
and industry practice constituted good faith. See State v. 
Frech Funeral Home, 448 A.2d 1037, 1041-43 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1982).9 
 
2. Analogous Federal Statutes 
 
The federal wage and overtime statutes also include a 
good-faith defense, and we believe that our precedents 
interpreting the federal good-faith law are helpful in our 
task of interpreting the state provision. The federal law 
includes two good-faith provisions.10 One of these is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The District Court inadvertently cited Frech as a New Jersey Supreme 
Court case. See Keeley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Were Frech actually a 
state supreme court case, we would obviously adhere to its 
interpretation of the state good-faith defense, even though the court 
appeared to ignore a requirement of that defense. However, as Frech is 
actually a trial court decision, it is at most persuasive but nonbinding 
authority and we look to the plain language of the statute and our own 
interpretation of the good-faith defense in predicting how the state 
supreme court would apply the defense to the facts of this case. 
 
10. The two good-faith defenses offer different protections. The first, 29 
U.S.C. S 259, provides a complete defense to an action for unpaid wages, 
while the second, id. S 260, gives a court discretion to award less than 
the statutory amount of liquidated damages, but still requires the 
defendant to pay compensatory damages for unpaid wages. 
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identical in all material respects to the New Jersey good- 
faith statute. See 29 U.S.C. S 259(a) (1994); cf. Dole v. Odd 
Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689, 696 (4th Cir. 
1990) (noting that the good-faith defense in S 259 requires 
a "written regulation, order, ruling, approval, or 
interpretation that could have been relied on"). The second 
federal provision is less strict,11 requiring only that "the 
employer [show] to the satisfaction of the court that the act 
or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and 
that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or 
omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act." 29 U.S.C. S 260 (1994). 
 
While S 260 requires simply good faith and"reasonable 
grounds," as opposed to the New Jersey law's requirement 
of reliance on an administrative regulation, order, practice, 
or policy, cases involving S 260 are still informative for their 
interpretation of the "good faith" requirement. For example, 
in Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., this court held: 
 
       The fact that an employer has broken the law for a 
       long time without complaints from employees does not 
       demonstrate the requisite good faith required by the 
       statute. . . . [T]he employer must affirmatively establish 
       that he acted in good faith by attempting to ascertain 
       the Act's requirements. 
 
747 F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 1984). Under Williams, Loomis 
Fargo's longstanding practice of not paying overtime and its 
union's apparent acquiescence in this practice are 
insufficient to establish good faith--even leaving aside the 
existence (or lack thereof) of a regulation, order, practice, or 
policy on which defendant relied. 
 
More recently, we discussed the good-faith defense in 
S 260 in Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 
(3d Cir. 1991). In Martin, we held that the district court 
erred in finding that the employer had proved the good- 
faith defense, citing three factors in particular. First, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Cf. 29 C.F.R. S 790.17(i) n.110 (1998) (noting that the fact that an 
employer has no defense under S 259 would not preclude a court from 
finding that the employer had met the requirements for the defense in 
S 260). 
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reiterating the holding in Williams, we held that the 
employer's "failure to inquire into the Act's overtime pay 
requirements before [the agency's investigation] precludes a 
determination that the company's subjective good faith was 
reasonable." Id. at 909. Second, we held that "the 
employer's adherence to customary and widespread 
industry practices that violate the Act's overtime pay 
provisions is not evidence of an objectively reasonable good 
faith violation." Id. at 910. Finally, we rejected the district 
court's contention that an employer could violate overtime 
requirements as a " `reasonable and necessary' competitive 
response[ ] to the `market for qualified employees.' " Id. 
(quoting district court). We noted that "[t]his reasoning 
tends improperly to favor companies in industries where 
economic conditions make violations of the Act most 
attractive or pervasive." Id. 
 
Williams and Martin, therefore, provide that reasonable 
good faith is not shown when an employer does not inquire 
about the law's requirements, simply follows an industry 
trend of not complying with the law, or violates the law in 
order to remain competitive. Although we will not assume 
that New Jersey's courts would adopt this federal 
jurisprudence unaltered, we note again that these cases 
involved the federal good-faith defense with the lower 
standard, while the language of the New Jersey statute is 
virtually identical to that of the stricter of the two federal 
good-faith provisions. The federal jurisprudence also seems 
eminently sensible. Therefore, these cases likely present the 
minimum standard that a New Jersey employer must meet 
in order to enjoy the protections of that state's good-faith 
defense to a failure to pay overtime. 
 
3. Federal Regulations 
 
Although federal wage and hour regulations obviously do 
not apply to New Jersey's wage law, such regulations 
contain explanations of each term in S 259 (each of which 
terms also appears in the New Jersey good-faith provision), 
and may be helpful in interpreting the New Jersey good- 
faith defense. The regulations note that "the employer's 
`good faith' is not to be determined merely from the actual 
state of his mind." 29 C.F.R. S 790.15(a) (1998). Rather, 
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" `good faith' also depends upon an objective test--whether 
the employer . . . acted as a reasonably prudent man would 
have acted under the same or similar circumstances." Id. 
 
The regulations also state, as we did in Williams and 
Martin, that an employer has an affirmative duty to inquire 
about uncertain coverage issues, such as might arise if 
conflicting court decisions exist. See id. S 790.15(b); id. 
S 790.15(d) n.99 ("It is not intended that this defense shall 
apply where an employer had knowledge of conflicting rules 
and chose to act in accordance with the one most favorable 
to him." (quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 4390 (1947) (statement of 
Rep. Walter))). Such uncertainty appears to have existed 
here, before the state regulation was promulgated. See 28 
N.J. Reg. at 3799 ("[R]ecent court cases have raised an 
issue as to whether overtime was required in New Jersey."). 
 
Finally, the regulations make clear that an employer may 
not assert the good-faith defense on the basis of the 
relevant agency's non-action: 
 
       A failure to act or a failure to reply to an inquiry on the 
       part of an administrative agency is not a "regulation, 
       order, ruling, approval, or interpretation" within the 
       meaning of [S 259]. . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
       . . . [While t]his should not be construed as meaning 
       that an agency may not have administrative practices 
       or policies to refrain from taking certain action as well 
       as practices or policies contemplating positive acts of 
       some kind . . . , there must be evidence of [the practice 
       or policy's] adoption by the agency through some 
       affirmative action establishing it as the practice or 
       policy of the agency. 
 
29 C.F.R. SS 790.17(f), 790.18(h). 
 
In the absence of further guidance from the New Jersey 
courts, we believe that federal courts faced with a party 
asserting New Jersey's good-faith defense may consider the 
above explication of S 259, the requirements of which are, 
in all material respects, identical to those of the New Jersey 
statute. In particular, the District Court in this case could 
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properly consider on remand the above discussion of"good 
faith" and of S 259's "practice or policy" provision. 
 
4. Summary 
 
Although New Jersey caselaw is virtually nonexistent on 
the requirements of that state's good-faith defense to a 
failure to pay statutory overtime rates, we believe that the 
plain text of the good-faith provision, along with our own 
caselaw on the similar federal good-faith defenses and the 
detailed federal regulations interpreting those defenses, 
provide ample guidance in this area. First and foremost, 
New Jersey's good-faith defense is clearly unavailable when 
an employer is not relying on one of the enumerated 
sources in the statute, such as a regulation, practice, or 
policy of the state labor agency. Further, like the federal 
good-faith defenses, New Jersey's law requires good-faith 
reliance, and we have held that good faith is absent when 
the employer fails to investigate a law's requirements, or 
simply relies on a longstanding practice (of either the 
employer itself or its industry) of failing to pay overtime or 
on union acquiescence in such failure. We believe that, in 
the absence of further guidance from New Jersey's appellate 
courts, these standards should be used by federal courts 
evaluating an employer's good-faith claims under New 
Jersey law. 
 
B. Defendant's Pre-Regulation Failure to Pay Overtime 
 
In finding that defendant had adequately made out a 
good-faith defense for the period prior to enactment of the 
trucking industry regulation, the District Court pointed out 
that defendant's collective bargaining agreement with the 
relevant employees provided that, with certain exceptions 
not applicable here, "there will be no premium pay for 
hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, and all such 
hours will be paid at the employee's straight-time rate." 
Keeley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Further, the court found 
that "there is no indication that any trucking industry 
employer in New Jersey has been required to pay its 
employees one and one-half times their regular hourly rate 
for overtime, either before or after the regulation was 
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issued." Id. Finally, the court relied on a declaration by 
defendant's counsel that, during contract negotiations, "the 
Company representatives present believed that the Motor 
Carrier exemption of the [FLSA] preempted state law and 
that the employees other than vault personnel were exempt 
from any overtime pay requirements." Id. at 452 n.10 
(alteration in original). 
 
For a number of reasons, we do not believe that these 
factors provide sufficient support for a finding that the 
defendant's failure to pay overtime prior to August 5, 1996, 
fell under the good-faith defense of the New Jersey statute. 
First and foremost, the statute clearly requires that the 
good-faith belief be based on either (1) a written regulation, 
order, ruling, approval or interpretation from one of the 
designated state authorities or (2) an "administrative 
practice or enforcement policy" of the relevant state 
agencies. Yet neither the factors cited by the District Court 
nor anything we can find in the record indicates that, prior 
to August 5, 1996, defendant relied on a written document, 
practice, or enforcement policy of the state labor 
department in not paying its employees time-and-a-half for 
overtime work. 
 
Further, looking to Williams and Martin, and the federal 
regulations, as providing an interpretative source for the 
New Jersey statute, it is unclear what affirmative steps the 
defendant took to ascertain the overtime law's requirements 
before promulgation of the regulation. It apparently relied 
primarily on industry practice, but if this is insufficient for 
the lower standard in S 260, as Williams  and Martin held, it 
would almost certainly be insufficient for the higher 
standard of S 259--and of New Jersey's good-faith defense. 
 
Finally, we note that the good-faith defense was accepted 
by the District Court at the summary judgment stage, 
following minimal discovery. Further discovery may (or may 
not) reveal that the defendant knew that it was violating 
state law by not paying its employees overtime, but sought 
to avoid the consequences of its actions by inducing the 
union to agree to the overtime "waiver." Other ramifications 
of the good-faith defense could emerge in discovery that 
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create issues that need eventual resolution by afinder of 
fact.12 
 
The defendant argues that plaintiffs may not now 
contend that discovery is needed on the good-faith defense, 
as they took the position before the District Court that 
further discovery was not necessary. See Appellee's Br. at 
21 n.18. However, the plaintiffs reasonably believed that 
the District Court was ruling only on the validity of the 
trucking industry regulation, and not on defendant's good- 
faith defense, when they declined to request further 
discovery. See J.A. at 51 (Magis. Order of July 1, 1998) 
(ordering the "parties to cross-move for summary judgment 
on validity of N.J.A.C. 12:56-19.3"). We therefore will 
reverse the District Court's judgment in defendant's favor 
for the period before the regulation's enactment. We also 
leave it for the District Court on remand to determine what, 
if any, discovery is necessary and appropriate for 
adjudication of defendant's good-faith defense. 
 
C. Defendant's Post-Regulation Failure to Pay Overtime 
 
Because it found the regulation valid, the District Court 
did not reach the issue whether the company had 
demonstrated a good-faith defense for its post-regulation 
failure to pay overtime. See Keeley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 451 
n.9. It appears that, for its post-regulation conduct, the 
company was relying on a written regulation to justify its 
failure to pay overtime. However, the record is silent on this 
issue, and therefore we will leave it for the District Court on 
remand to determine whether defendant acted in good faith 
in not paying its employees overtime following promulgation 
of the regulation. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Defendant Loomis Fargo may not invoke the regulation 
governing trucking industry employees as a justification for 
its failure to pay overtime. We find that the Commissioner 
exceeded his authority in enacting this regulation. If the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that the burden to plead and prove good faith is on the 
defendant. 
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defendant relied in good faith on this regulation in its 
failure to pay the statutory overtime rate, it may avoid 
liability for the period following the regulation's enactment 
(on August 5, 1996) under New Jersey's statutory good- 
faith defense. We leave this issue for the District Court to 
determine on remand. Finally, following any appropriate 
discovery, the District Court should also revisit on remand 
whether defendant was relying on an administrative 
regulation, order, practice, or policy in not paying overtime 
prior to August 5, 1996, as is required by New Jersey's 
good-faith defense. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed, and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Plaintiffs belatedly argue on appeal that we should order the District 
Court to remand this case to state court under the doctrine known as 
Burford abstention. We believe that this argument has no merit. Burford 
abstention applies when a federal court is asked to enjoin a state 
administrative order that will injure the plaintiff (such as an order 
granting an oil drilling permit to a competitor or denying the plaintiff 
permission to discontinue an unprofitable line of business). As the 
Supreme Court has put it: 
 
       Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a 
federal 
       court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the 
proceedings 
       or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are 
       "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
       substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in 
       the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review 
of 
       the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of 
       state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a 
matter 
       of substantial public concern." 
 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 
361 (1989) (citation omitted); see also Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine & 
Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 956 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The present case primarily involves a claim for damages, not equitable 
relief. Further, there are no "proceedings or orders of state 
administrative agencies" at issue here, only state regulations of general 
applicability. Cases implicating Burford abstention involve state orders 
against an individual party that a federal-court plaintiff seeks to 
enjoin. 
Here, there is a state regulation that affects all trucking industry 
employers, not a specific administrative order aimed at one party. 
Therefore, abstention under Burford is clearly inappropriate. 
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